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Joshua Knobe (2003a, b) presented data that suggest people’s judgments of a behavior’s
intentionality may be significantly influenced by moral considerations.  In particular, Knobe
(2003b) argues that when people judge the intentionality of an action with moral consequences,
they fail to consider an important component of intentionality — the agent’s skill (Malle &
Knobe, 1997) — that they do consider when judging an almost identical action with neutral
consequences.  This finding raises a number of issues about the consistency of intentionality
judgments and perhaps even the unity of the folk concept of intentionality.  Moreover, it raises
the specter of a bias in people’s thinking, namely  to ignore important information when judging
morally significant actions, which, if true, would have considerable impact on legal proceedings.
A replication of Knobe’s results appears to be needed, not only to establish the findings
within a different subject population (in this case, first- and second-year college students) but
also to examine the robustness of Knobe’s effect when varying certain methodological and
conceptual parameters.  The parameters that were varied in the present study ranged from
presentation format to action formulation to response options.
Just over 300 participants were presented with a one-page questionnaire as part of a
larger survey packet. The sample consisted of 74% women, 77% Caucasians, with a median age
of 18 years. The questionnaire asked participants to respond to Knobe’s (2003b) rifle scenario,
which was either an act of shooting a bull’s eye with the morally neutral consequence of winning
a contest or an act of shooting a person with the immoral consequence of killing the person in an
attempt to acquire inheritance money.
The scenarios were as follows:
Contest
Jake desperately wants to win the rifle contest. He knows that he will only win the
contest if he hits the bulls-eye. He raises the rifle, gets the bull’s-eye in the sights, and
pulls the trigger. Jake is an expert marksman. His hands are steady. The gun is aimed
perfectly… The bullet lands directly on the bull’s-eye. [Luck: But Jake isn’t very good at
using his rifle. His hand slips on the barrel of the gun, and the shot goes wild, bouncing
off a heavy post.  Nonetheless, the bullet lands directly on the bull’s-eye.] Jake wins the
contest.
Inheritance
Jake desperately wants to have more money. He knows that he will inherit a lot of money
when his aunt dies. One day, he sees his aunt walking by the window. He raises his rifle,
gets her in the sights, and pulls the trigger.  Jake is an expert marksman. His hands are
steady. The gun is aimed perfectly… The bullet hits her directly in the heart. [Luck: But
Jake isn’t very good at using his rifle. His hand slips on the barrel of the gun, and the shot
goes wild, bouncing off a heavy post.  Nonetheless, the bullet hits her directly in the
heart.]  She dies instantly.
The report of the findings of this study are organized into five sections: Overall
replication; effects of presentation format; effects of action verb choice; and effects of response
options.
1. Overall Replication
Of the entire sample of 228 participants, 155 were presented with the neutral (contest)
scenario, 73 with the moral (inheritance) scenario, and of each group, half saw the Luck version
and half saw the Skill version, resulting in a 2 (moral vs. neutral) × 2 (luck vs. skill) design.  The
first research question was whether we could replicate Knobe’s basic results.  Table 1 shows
people’s blame and praise ratings and Table 2 shows people’s intentionality ratings.
Table 1.  Evaluations (praise or blame) of stimulus action under conditions of luck or skill.
Luck Skill
How much praise does Jake deserve for
hitting the bull’s eye? [from 0, no
praise, to 6, a lot of praise]
3.1 5.2
How much blame does Jake deserve for
shooting* his aunt? [from 0, no blame,
to 6, a lot of blame]
5.8 5.8
* Note: The displayed means are averaged across three verb forms (hit, shoot, kill).
Table 2.  Intentionality judgments of stimulus action under conditions of luck or skill.
Luck Skill
Did Jake hit the bull’s-eye
intentionally? (Yes, No) 30% 90%
Did Jake shoot* his aunt
intentionally? (Yes, No) 85% 97%
* Note: The displayed means are averaged across three verb forms (hit, shoot, kill).
The results displayed in Tables 1 and 2 clearly replicate Knobe’s (2003b) findings, such
that people differentiate between hitting a bull’s eye with luck and hitting it with skill but do not
sufficiently differentiate the parallel case of shooting a person with luck or shooting her with
skill.  This differentiation in the neutral scenario is substantial for the evaluative ratings, F(154)
= 33.6, p <  .001, η2 = 18%, as well as for the intentionality judgments, F(154) = 30.3, p <  .001,
η2 = 16%.  By contrast, in the moral scenario no differentiation exists for evaluative ratings, F <
1, η2 = 0%, and only a marginally significant differentation exists for the intentionality
judgments, F(154) = 3.7, p <  .06, η2 = 2%.
2. Presentation Format
One of the parameters we explored was presentation format.  In many domains of human
cognition, making an absolute judgment of a stimulus in isolation is significantly more difficult
than making a relative judgment of that stimulus relative to another.  Thus, we wondered
whether people might be more sensitive to the luck vs. skill difference for moral action if they
saw the two conditions (luck and skill) side by side.  However, such a presentation format did
not alter the results, either for blame ratings or intentionality judgments.   If anything, the slight
differentiation of intentionality judgments we saw between the two conditions for the aunt’s
murder in the separate presentations (85% vs. 97%, Table 2) is lost, as the rates are now 95% and
97%, F < 1.   An additional question asked participants  what the main difference was between
the two scenarios.  The free-response answers reveal that about 80% did recognize the presence
vs. absence of skill as the critical difference, but apparently that difference was not sufficient to
make a difference in their blame and intentionality judgments.
3. Effects of Verb Choice
In the original scenario by Knobe (2003b), the verb chosen to describe the immoral act
was kill.  It may be argued that this term has strong connotations of intentionality and may
therefore be biasing people’s responses toward intentionality.  To examine this possibility we
created three verb conditions for the immoral act: Did he “hit his aunt’s heart?” (N = 79), “shoot
his aunt?” (N = 38), and “kill his aunt?” (N = 40)?
Table 3. Blame ratings for different verbs describing the stimulus action
Luck Skill
How much blame does Jake deserve
for hitting his aunt’s heart? 4.3 5.5
How much blame does Jake deserve
for shooting his aunt?? 5.8 5.8
How much blame does Jake deserve
for killing his aunt? 6.0 5.8
Table 4. Intentionality judgments for different verbs describing the stimulus action
Luck Skill
Did Jake hit his aunt’s heart
intentionally? (Yes, No)
49% 95%
Did Jake shoot his aunt intentionally?
(Yes, No)
84% 90%
Did Jake kill his aunt intentionally?
(Yes, No)
100% 100%
The results suggest that when the act is formulated as hitting the aunt’s heart people
differentiate luck from skill both in their blaming responses (Table 3), F(1, 153) = 20.2, p <
.001, η2 = 12%, and in their intentionality judgments (Table 4), F(1, 153) = 35.2, p <  .001, η2 =
19%.  In fact, the differentiation that people show between hitting the aunt’s heart with skill vs.
luck is now almost as large (95% vs. 49%) as the one we saw for hitting the bull’s eye (30% vs.
90%).
The question now arises why the particular action verb would matter so much.  There are
at least three interpretations to consider.  First, the words kill or shoot might have such a strong
connotation of intentionality that people’s judgments are biased toward ignoring the moderate
amount of luck the person’s action relied on.  However, this explanation seems weakened by the
fact that kill is more reliably used to indicate an intentional act than is shoot.
Second, the verbs shoot and kill might have such strong connotations of immorality that
participants override their cognitive analysis of the problem and react more in light of their moral
outrage.  This interpretation concurs with Knobe’s (2003b) claim that moral sentiments change
the folk criteria for intentionality, but it offers a way out of this problem, namely, by choosing
precise, behavioral action verbs.
Third, one major difference between the original killing-aunt scenario and the hitting-
bull’s-eye scenario is that, holding constant the shooting distance, there are many more ways of
killing a person (e.g., hitting her head, throat, heart, lungs…) than there are to hit a bull’s eye.  In
other words, the task is less specified in the killing-aunt scenario.  Participants may therefore be
lenient about the skill condition, because Jake’s intention may not have been “to hit the aunt’s
heart” but rather “to shoot her in any way possible.”  So even if Jake’s hand slipped and the shot
went wild, he still fulfilled his rather unspecific intention, hence acted intentionally.
One way to directly test this third interpretation is to hold constant the specificity of the
intention in each scenario and then test the impact of skill on intentionality judgments.  This can
be achieved, for example, by featuring Jake shooting a life-size dummy in the contest scenario or
by featuring, in a somewhat science-fiction inspired murder scenario, an assassin’s intention of
shooting the target’s brains (e.g., to destroy her memory) but ending up shooting her heart.
5. Effects of Response Options
In the original scenarios, Knobe (2003b) asked participants a dichotomous question: Did
Jake perform his action intentionally or not?  This dichotomy may veil a more subtle reaction
that people have to the scenarios.  For example, people may refuse to say that Jake acted
unintentionally (it wasn’t entirely an accident), so they choose the slightly more fitting, though
not ideal option of “he acted intentionally.” Of course, this tension exists only in the case of the
immoral action and not in the case of the neutral action (the contest scenario).  There may still be
a difference between the two types of scenario due to morality, but the difference may not need
to refer to the concept of intentionality but to people’s reluctance to express anything that would
indicate they let a murderer get out of his deserved punishment.
As an initial attempt to offer more than two response options, we formulated the
following questions (N = 71):
Did Jake shoot his aunt intentionally?
 No, he didn’t shoot her intentionally (he got lucky), but he deserves full blame.
 Not sure whether one can call that intentional, but either way he deserves full blame
 Yes, there is no doubt that he shot her intentionally.
The same options were formulated correspondingly in the contest scenario, and the
comparison between the two scenarios yielded the following results for the Luck condition (the
Skill rates are in parentheses):
Table 5. Finer-grained intentionality judgments in the luck condition (with the skill condition in
parentheses)
No Not sure Yes, no doubt
Did Jake hit the bull’s-eye
intentionally? (Yes, No) 71% (6%) 29% (25%) 0% (69%)
Did Jake shoot his aunt
intentionally? (Yes, No) 0% (5%) 32% (16%) 68% (69%)
The results show that increased response options did not change the pattern of results, at
least not for the formulation using the verb shoot (the only one we tested).  Even though a third
of the participants are “not sure” whether Jake’s shooting was intentional, virtually the same
proportion of participants has similar doubts with respect to the intentionality of the contest-
winning act.  Most important, 68% of people consider Jake’s lucky shooting act intentional when
it kills his aunt whereas 0% consider it intentional when it hits the bull’s eye.  An important
experimental variation would be to present these finer-grained response options in the face of
scenarios that vary in verb choice for the stimulus action (e.g., hitting vs. killing).
6. Interim Conclusions
The findings by Knobe (2003b) were replicated under a number of conditions: in the
original formulation and format, when presenting Luck and Skill conditions side by side, and
when three rather than two response options were made available.  Under these conditions we
see that people judge a neutral act of hitting the bull’s-eye in a contest intentional only if the
agent’s shooting skill is evident, whereas they judge an immoral act of shooting one’s aunt as
intentional no matter whether the agent’s shooting skill is evident.
However, the precise description under which the action is presented and intentionality
judgments are made (i.e., hitting, shooting, or killing) has a substantial effect on both blame and
intentionality judgments.  In particular, the original finding by Knobe (and the abovementioned
replications) all rely on the use of verbs like shoot or kill and do not replicate when one describes
the action at issue in more specific terms such as hitting the aunt’s heart.  This pattern of results
suggests that people’s judgments are sensitive to the precise action under consideration.  For
shooting or killing a person from a reasonable distance, a certain amount of luck can be ignored
as long as the intention was an unspecific “bringing about the aunt’s death.”  If, however, one
wants to know whether the agent performed a specific (and difficult) act of, say, hitting the
aunt’s heart (or hitting the tiny bull’s eye, for that matter), the presence of skill or luck is taken
into account. At present, we must therefore be skeptical of the strong thesis that people’s
judgments of intentionality are influenced by moral considerations.  The findings that show such
influence (by Knobe, 2003b, and our replications) may be confounded with an asymmetry of
intention-action specificity.
Note
An updated and expanded version of this report is available at
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~bfmalle (Click on Publications).
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